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Comment:
Professor Sallyanne Payton

University of Michigan
Low School
Commenting on Thomas E. Kauper's
"A ntitrust: Economic Reg ulation or
Deregulator?"
Professor Pa yton proposed to comm e nt on both Professor Steiner's and
Professor Kauper's papers since both
add r essed the "cu rrent crisis of
regulatory leg itim acy and co mpetence ." Steiner's theory that this
current co ntrovers y arose from irrita tion ge n era ted by "social," as distinct from eco nomic , regula tion first
received Pa yto n 's attention .
Like Steiner, Pa yton questioned
why eco nomi c r egulation has taken
th e forms it has and why we have
recently become dissatisfied with
th e m. Law incorporates a society's
fundam e ntal understanding of what
constitutes right conduct. giving
some va lues priorit y through protection and enforcement. It does this
nega tiv e ly. legislating against evil
rather than in favor of good .
" Passing regu latory statutes in
legislatures generally r eq uires .
th e refore. the identification of a
bad," Payton said . " We love to
regulate the devil. " said Pa yton , but
it is the devil without. Outcry against
regulation arises when the general
rules we create to restrict' them ' turn
out to apply to ourselves as well.
Antiregulator y sentiment also
arises from th e reali za tion that ·we'
pay the price even of regu lation
directed at corporations. That the
economic consequences of regulation would provoke reaction. particularly in a stagnant economy,
could have been predicted.
Yet if antiregulatory sentiment
was easy to anticipate. how can we
ex plain the proliferation of regulation from the lat e 1960 to the mid
1970s? The shortcomings of a lega l
education which implies that law
can solve most problems was in part
at fault.
The institutional autonomy of law
was also a factor . "Lawyers create
their own precedents .... What is
most striking about regulation is how
imitative it is." Legislators draw on a
model, thoughtlessly treating as
analogous conditions which differ
greatly in significance and cost.
Political forces conjoining the
previously unorganized interests of
environmentalists or consumers also
account for the spread of social
regulation. To say that is to demonstrate that what is at issue when
we discuss legalization is really
control.

"In this society," Payton emphasized, "we control through law ."
Because we cherish private freedom,
we use government only sparingly
and in accordance with standards of
due process . Land , capital, and industrial facilities are in private , not
government, hands . Regulation,
designed to control the power of
these private agents to injure others,
is also subject to procedural and substantive restrictions protecting the
regulated . Reform in the name of
streamlining which reduces these
protections "will produce regulation
without law , which has always been
thought to be a dangerous thing,"
"'Lega li zation' is an undesirable
byproduct ," Pa yto n said, "of social
co ntrol by rules. " Our faith in law
prompts us to seek to control through
legislation and to seek redress
through the courts . Citizens become
increasingly dependent on lawye rs
to define rights and responsibilities,
and minimum lega l acceptability
becomes the standard for action .
Yet we would not want to control
these undesirable consequences by
"asking individuals to forego their
right to petition their government to
act ." or to sue , Payton noted . Like
a n y other exte rnality. legalization
must be controlled by government.
The first step . Pa yton said, is for
gove rnment to restrain itself. Costbenefit analyses and regulatory
budgets ca n make government
anticipate the consequences of its
decisions .
Deregulatory pressure has shifted
the burden of proof onto those
who desire more regulation. Until
recently, the costs and burdens of
regulations were irrelevant to the
eva luation of a regulatory agency 's
performance . Even those who
believe that the past century's
regu lation has indeed given us a
h ea lthier , clean er, and more nearly
just societ y should welcome attitudes which will impede the enactment of ill-conceived and frivolous
restrictions .
Pa yton 's view that good regulation
is that which represents public consensus led her to explore a central
conceptual question raised by
Ka u per' s discussion of an ti trust:
"Should we be using the common
law courts to develop any economic
regulatory policy?"
An advantage lies in these courts'
reliance on a standard of reasonableness and broad principles applied b y generalist judges. Antitrust
litiga tion has allowed us to scrutinize
and deregulate industries which
hav e enjoyed close and cordial relations with their regulators .
Problems arise, however , because
antitrust is unlike other common law
litigation in that its standards are not

grounded in internalized communit y values. Economic reality and
real business behavior are not the
subjects of such populist standards,
Pa yton argued. In absence of this
traditional basis of common law
decision making, even judges are at
sea in deciding antitrust cases.
Business ' s demand for clear
articulation of obligations is then
readil y understandable . particularl y
in th e light of the treble damages
remedy. The degree of risk involved
in antitrust, combined with the unusual pervasiveness of potential
e nforcement by private litigation ,
makes every business fearful and attentive to the risk-averse advice of
counsel.
Beca use antitrust law has largely
eliminated the ultimate reality check
of a jury trial , it has lost some of the
advantages of common law litigation . Like economic regulation, then ,
antitrust becomes intellectuall y insulated. Law ye rs become more
oracular and inscrutible as antitrust
is taken over b y the arid, static
models of economists.
Although
Pa y ton
thus
demonstrated that antitrust may
resemble economic regulation. she
also concurred with Kauper's characterization of it as paradoxical.
noting that antitrust can also be a
tremendous deregulator. The value
of antitrust is that it offers a fall-back
position. Pa yton argued. It enables
us to break the closed circle of
regulator and regulatee and to
remove the mantle of uniqueness
from an industry without turning it
loose from all regulation .
Nevertheless, in its own functioning. antitrust turns out to be regulation. "I tend to agree with Professor
Kauper ," Pa y ton closed, "that it is
regulation of a sort that is in some intellectual trouble at the moment."
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